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Jurisdiction of the Court
Jurisdiction is before this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §78-2a-3.
Statement of Issues
Plaintiff failed to sue defendant, Bryant Ross, within the four year statute of
limitations but did file an amended complaint, adding Bryant Ross as a defendant
five weeks after the statute of limitations expired. Plaintiff claimed that there was an
identity of interest between Mr. Ross and his father, who was named in the original
complaint, because of a family relationship, and that the complaint should therefore
relate back in time. Plaintiff also argued that because Mr. Ross allegedly would
suffer no prejudice by being forced to defend against the action, the complaint
should relate back in time. The court held that there was no identity of interest
between Mr. Ross and his father, and that summary judgment was appropriate in the
circumstances. Three issues are presented:
(1) Did the trial court err in its decision that there was no identity of interest
between Bryant Ross and his father?
(2) Did the trial court err in determining that the amended complaint did not
relate back in time to the filing of the initial complaint?
(3) Did the court err in granting summary judgment to Bryant Ross?
These are questions of law, and are reviewed de novo. Butterfield v. Okubo. 831
P.2d 97 (Utah 1992).

-1-

Statement of the Case
Procedural Background: This is an appeal from the trial court's decision to
grant summary judgment in favor of Mr. Bryant Ross, defendant and appellee.
Defendant Christopher Ross also filed a motion for summary judgment, which was
granted. That decision is not subject to this appeal.
Facts of the Case: The plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident on
November 21, 1996. The police were called to the scene and a police report was
prepared. The police report clearly identified the other driver as defendant, Bryant
Ross. (Addendum A) Approximately four-and-a-half months after the accident on
April 2, 1997, the plaintiff gave a recorded statement in which she acknowledged
that the other car was driven by defendant, Bryant Ross. (Addendum B) On
November 17, 2000, plaintiff filed a verified complaint to recover damages for
personal injuries that she allegedly suffered in an auto accident. The complaint was
filed only four days before the statute of limitations expired and in it she wrongfully
identified Christopher Ross as the individual who was at fault for causing the
collision.

Christopher Ross was served with a Summons and Complaint on

December 18, 2000, approximately four weeks after the statute of limitations had
run.
Six weeks after filing her initial complaint, and five weeks after the statute of
limitations had run, Ms. Penrose amended her pleadings to name the appellee,
Bryant Ross, as an additional defendant. The new complaint alleged that Bryant
-2-
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Ms. Penrose also argued that her prior designation of a "John Doe"
indant preserved her action against Bryant Ross. In fact this was her main
f-ient below. She has not raised the issue here, however, and therefore has
(lit.
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that the defendants had a common insurer and common legal counsel does not
establish an identity of interest. Since neither party was answerable for the
negligence of the other, the defendants had different legal interests and positions
with respect to the litigation underlying this appeal.

The trial court, therefore,

decided correctly when it found that the parties did not have an identity of interest
and that the amended complaint did not relate back.
Argument
Introduction
Both the facts and legal issues underlying this case are simple and
straightforward. Ms. Penrose failed to file a complaint against Bryant Ross within the
period prescribed by law. Mr. Ross moved for summary judgment on that basis, and
Ms. Penrose opposed, alleging that her amended complaint should be viewed as
timely, because Bryant Ross and his father shared an identity of interest.
The identity of interest argument made by Ms. Penrose both here and in the
trial court below is based on two allegations:
(1) An identity of interest exists between Bryant Ross and Christopher Ross
because the factual circumstances show that Bryant Ross would suffer no prejudice
by being forced to defend this action; and,
(2) A father-son relationship is sufficient to establish an identity of interest, and
therefore the amended complaint should relate back in time.
The fundamental questions presented for this court's review concern the
scope of the "relation back" doctrine set out in Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
-4-

Procedure, and, whether the doctrine may be used to justify adding Bryant Ross to
the underlying litigation after the statute of limitation had run, merely because he has
a familial relationship with Christopher Ross. Mr. Ross is confident that when the
court carefully considers the circumstances of this case, and rigorously applies the
controlling principles of law, it will come to the same conclusion reached by the trial
court. Namely, Bryant Ross does not share an identity of interest with his father, and
the amended complaint naming him as a defendant was untimely filed. Summary
judgment, therefore, was appropriate.
Point I
IDENTITY OF INTEREST CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED MERELY BY
SHOWING A LACK OF PREJUDICE
In her opening brief Ms. Penrose repeatedly argues that her amended
complaint should relate back, because Mr. Ross has failed to show that he would
suffer any actual prejudice in defending the action.2 In contrast, she points out that
if the court declines to implement that doctrine, she will be deprived of her right to
pursue compensation for her injuries. On the surface, this claim to fairness has a
certain appeal. However, it comes into direct conflict with other policy choices made
by our legislature in setting time limits in which an action may be brought. These

2

Ms. Penrose claims that because Bryant and Christopher Ross shared
legal counsel (after Bryant Ross was finally sued and after the statute of
limitations had run) and were covered by the same insurance policy, the
investigation conducted by counsel would be useful for both parties. This is not
true here. Because Christopher was not operating the vehicle, his defense to the
first complaint was that he was not the person who allegedly caused Ms.
Penrose's injuries.
-5-

promote prompt investigation and adjudication of disputes, while penalizing those
who are dilatory. See, Breiaaar Props.. L.C. v. H.E. Davis & Sons. Inc.. 449 Utah
Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 2002). In fact, by their very nature, statutes of limitation must
operate without regard to individual questions of prejudice. After all, it is difficult, if
not impossible, to explain how a complaint filed one day after the running of the
statute causes prejudice to a defendant, while one filed a day before the statute runs
is deemed acceptable. Nevertheless, the legislature has determined that the former
is subject to dismissal, while the latter may go forward. Simply put, any test that
focuses exclusively on actual prejudice would end up swallowing the rule and would
emasculate limitations and the certainty they support.
As with any case, proper analysis requires that the parties and the court first
identify the governing rules of law. Accordingly, a brief review of the relevant case
and statutory authority is the proper place to begin the consideration of the issues
presented here. As is made clear from its text, Rule 15(c) - the source of the relation
back doctrine - is designed to allow a party to assert additional causes of action
against a named defendant, even though the time for making the new claims may
have passed.3 The rule is not, however, intended to function in the same manner
when it comes to adding new parties to pending litigation. This was made clear in
the seminal case of Doxev-Lavton Co. v. Clark, et.al.. 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah
1976), in which the Utah Supreme Court held that, generally, the relation back

3

The new causes of action must also arise out of the same course of
conduct detailed in the first pleadings.
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provisions of Rule 15(c) do not apply to amendments that substitute or add new
plaintiffs or new defendants to an action. In making this decision, the Court
expressed a specific concern that if the rule was used to justify the easy addition of
new parties, the very purpose of statutes of limitation would be defeated.
Doxev. supra, did, however, carve out a narrow exception to this general rule.
The Court stated that if the party to be added had an identity of interest with a party
already before the court, the amendment would be considered timely. Id., at 906.
In so holding, the court reasoned that this exception was not harmful because where
there was a true identity, the new party would not suffer any prejudice.
The Doxev exception has become the source of considerable controversy.
Parties, such as the appellant here, have latched onto the court's language
regarding the lack of prejudice, and sought to use it to justify the late joinder of new
defendants in any number of circumstances. This formulation of Doxev's holding,
however, turns the case on its head. A careful reading of the opinion shows that the
presence of an "identity of interest" is the actual predicate for relation back, and that
the reference to a "lack of prejudice" is made only to show that the exception will not
lead to injustice. Ms. Penrose's construction of Doxev. which focuses on the
presence or absence of prejudice, suffers from the basic logical error of false
equivalency. While the existence of a predicate may create certain extrinsic
conditions, the presence of those extrinsic conditions does not always mean that the
predicate is present.

Or, in terms directly applicable to the issues under

consideration here, an "identity of interest" may ensure a lack of prejudice, but the
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mere absence of prejudice does not necessarily indicate the existence of the identity
of interest. Plaintiff's arguments that prejudice must always be shown to invoke the
statute of limitations would effectively destroy all limitations of actions. Uncertainty
would abound and legislative intent would be ignored.
If a lack of prejudice is not equivalent to an "identity of interest", how, then,
should the phrase be defined? This is the next step.
Point II
THE PHRASE "IDENTITY OF INTEREST" IS A TERM OF ART USED
TO DESCRIBE A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTIES THAT IS
CHARACTERIZED BY A COMMON LEGAL INTEREST OR
POSITION. CHRISTOPHER AND BRYANT ROSS DID NOT HAVE
THE SAME POSITION
As implied, above, the appellant appears to view the test set out in Doxev as
an empty vessel, which may be filled by any relationship between new defendants
and old, if the relationship involves the possibility of communication. In appellant's
view an identity of interest is established upon a showing that it was likely that the
old party would have told the party to be added that a lawsuit was pending. (Here
appellant is focusing on the question of constructive notice, which is really a variation
on the lack of prejudice argument detailed earlier. The role notice plays in the
analysis of these issues will be addressed below.) Such a standard, unfortunately,
suffers from a number of basic flaws. For instance, it ignores the plain language
chosen by the Utah Supreme Court to describe the circumstances that allow relation
back. It also fails to take into account how the standard has actually been applied in

-8-

the past quarter of a century. And, finally, the appellant's version of the identity of
interest test is so expansive that it allows the exception to swallow the rule.
a. Identity of Interest is a defined term, with a precise meaning which
does not apply here: The most obvious problem with Ms. Penrose's understanding
of the expression "identity of interest", is that it fails to recognize that the language
used in Doxev has a precise meaning. The phrase "identity of interest" is, after all,
one that is commonly used in a number of legal contexts, ranging from the
certification of class action lawsuits to the implementation of the doctrine of res
judicata. See, for example, Condor v. Hunt. 1 P.3d 558 (Utah App. 2000), re: claim
preclusion; Nunnellv v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Oqden. 154
P.2d 620 (Utah 1944) re: class action lawsuits; and James Constructors. Inc. v. Salt
Lake City Corp.. 888 P.2d 665 (Utah App. 1994) re: surety and indemnity law. What
is significant about these cases is that in every instance the phrase "identity of
interest" is employed in the same way, i.e., to describe a relationship that is based
on a common legal position or common interest in a case.
Of course, this usage conforms with, and is most likely derived from, the
dictionary meaning of "identity", which inevitably involves the concept of "sameness",
See, Webster's Unabridged Dictionary.

2001, p. 950. According to the plain

language of the exception, in order for parties to share an "identity of interest" they
must share the "same" interest.
Ms. Penrose's proffered interpretation of the identity test utterly disregards the
plain language of the decision. But unless we are willing to believe that the Utah
-9-

Supreme Court chose its words carelessly, and in doing so jettisoned a wellestablished meaning for a commonly used phrase, the "identity of interest" test, as
set out in Doxev. must be interpreted as requiring an identity of legal interest or a
common legal position vis a vi the case at issue.
b. The restrictive interpretation is supported by case law and does not
fit the facts of this case: The more restrictive view of the test, which was adopted
by the trial court and is advocated here by Mr. Ross, also finds strong support in the
cases that have applied the standard to particular fact patterns over the years. In
Doxev. itself, the Court was faced with a dispute over a real estate contract, and
determined that an amended pleading that added the heirs of the parties named in
the original complaint, could relate back because there was an identity of interest
between the heirs and the decedents, who had signed the contract. This, of course,
is a classic example of a common position or interest in a case. The rights and
responsibilities of the heirs were in fact derived from - and in no way differed from the rights of their ancestors.
Similarly, in the recent case of Nunez v. Albo, et.al., 2002 Utah App. LEXIS
69 (Utah App. 2002), this court was presented with a case in which the plaintiff had
first sued a physician, and then sought to add his governmental employers, the
University of Utah and its medical school, as new defendants. This court found as
a matter of law that this type of relationship created an identity of interest, and that
the amended complaint would therefore relate back in time. As with the connection
between decedents and their heirs, an admitted employer-employee governmental
-10-

relationship (as it was there) presents a classic case of a common position or
interest in the litigation, because every aspect of the employer's liability is based on
what the employee has or has not done. And every defense asserted by the newly
added defendant is identical to the defenses possessed by the doctor.
In contrast to these cases are those which find that other relationships, no
matter how close, do not satisfy the "identity" test. The most instructive of these is
Russell v. The Standard Corporation. 898 P.2d263 (Utah 1995). There, the Plaintiff
alleged a claim for libel against the Associated Press and the Salt Lake Tribune in
her first complaint. After finding out that the article had originated with the Standard
Examiner in Ogden, Ms. Russell sought to add it as an additional defendant.
Although the statute of limitations had expired, Ms. Russell claimed that because the
parties had an active contractual relationship there was an identity of interest
between the various defendants. The Supreme Court rejected this contention out
of hand. Significantly, the Court made no inquiry into whether actual notice of the
claim was given, although it is clear that parties involved in an active business
relationship have both opportunity and reason to communicate about a variety of
issues presumably including the subject of Ms. Russell's suit. Instead, the court
simply pointed out that not all relationships involved an identity of interest.
For this reason, Ms. Penrose's argument that an identity of interest is present
in every relationship, in which the opportunity or likelihood that communication about
a pending suit could take place, is without support in the case law.

Mere

opportunity for or even communication is not enough. The parties must also share
-11-

the type of common legal bond or position described in Doxev. supra, and Nunez.
supra.
That is not true here. Christopher Ross and Bryant Ross are two separate
people. They own separate assets and incur separate debts, etc. It would be
absurd to suggest that they are legally common. Neither the original nor the
amended complaint based Christopher's liability on Bryant's actions. Christopher
and Bryant, therefore, did not share a common view or interest in the case; it was,
in fact, quite the opposite. Christopher's defense to the original complaint was to
point the finger at his son, while his defense to the amended complaint was to
express indifference. In neither case was he to be bound by the actions of Bryant.
The facts here do not resemble those of Doxev or Nunez, and the court should not
find an identity of interest.

4

c. The position advocated by the plaintiff has no principled boundaries:
Briefly, it should also be noted that the notice theory advanced by Ms. Penrose
contains no principled means of distinguishing between relationships that would
support an identity of interest and those which would not. If notice is the key, then
it could arise under a myriad of facts. For example, what would happen if a person
loaned his auto to a neighbor, and the friend caused injuries to a third party, who

4

The Oklahoma Court of Appeals recently reached the same conclusion in
Nusbaum v. Knobbe. 23 P.3d 302 (Ok.App. 2001). The court was presented with
a claim that a family relationship, the use of a common attorney and a common
insurer created an identity of interest. The court rejected the argument,
reasoning that familial relationships did not necessarily give rise to common legal
interests.
-12-

then brought suit against the auto's owner? Is close proximity in residence the type
of relationship that would support an assumption that notice was given? What if the
auto was given to a co-worker? Is this sufficient to support the assumption? What
about the case of a son who has become estranged from his father? Does the blood
tie, in and of itself, support an assumption of notice? The Oklahoma Court of
Appeals has answered this in the negative in Nusbaum. infra.
These hypothetical situations are offered to show that no "type" of relationship
can ensure that notice of a suit would be provided to another potential defendant.
In order to assure fairness a trial court would be required to engage in significant
pretrial inquiry to determine if actual notice was given. In the alternative, it could
simply assume that all relationships would imply that notice was given. (Since it
seems clear that a party wrongfully accused or only partially liable might well contact
other potential defendants to help share the blame or costs.) This, however, raises
the very problems noted by the Utah Supreme Court in Doxev. A test that provides
no reasonable boundaries threatens to undermine the statute of limitation. A better
option is to adopt the test accepted by the trial court and advocated here. It is firmly
based on the plain language the Court selected in announcing the exception, and
it conforms with standard modes of interpretation.
Point III

THE SO-CALLED MISNOMER CASES SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED
TO THE FACTS IN THIS CASE

-13-

In arguing that notice is sufficient to establish a legal identity, Ms. Penrose
cites to Sulzen v. Williams. 977 P.2d 497 (Utah App. 1999) and Wilcox v. Geneva
Rock Corp.. 911 P.2d. 367 (Utah 1996) as support for her position. While it is true
that these cases do appear to adopt a looser standard, a careful review of the facts
of those cases shows that they are completely inapposite to the issues presented
here.
Both Sulzen and Wilcox share a common fact pattern and fit within what are
commonly known as misnomer cases. In both cases the proper defendant was
identified in the body of the complaint, but was misnamed in the caption, and in both
the intended party was actually served with a copy of the summons and complaint.
Finally, in both cases the amendments that were sought by the plaintiffs, were
sought in order to correct a technical defect in the pleadings.
These misnomer cases are analytically different from cases in which a new
party is going to be added. For example, in misnomer cases there is no need to
inquire into whether the parties share a common interest, because there are not
multiple parties to consider. Similarly, in both Sulzen and Wilcox the fact that the
parties were actually served with process obviated any need to inquire into whether
notice was actually given. Each party had actually received notice. In Otchvv. City
of Elizabeth Board of Education. 737 A.2d 1151 (N.J.Super. 1999), the Superior
Court of New Jersey characterized the difference between misnomer cases and
those in which a new party was to be added, as a difference between a formal and
a substantive change. Noting that formal changes cause less concern.
-14-

In this case, the addition of Bryant Ross was not a formal or stylistic change.
It was not a mere correction of spelling or capacity, nor was it a mere substitution of
a misnamed party. (After all, Ms. Penrose maintained her action against Christopher
Ross.) The amended complaint named a separate individual, who had rights and
obligations separate and distinct from the party previously named. The more relaxed
standard that was enunciated in Sulzen and Wilcox, was predicated on the fact that
the actual parties were the same in both actions and is simply not applicable to the
facts presented here.
Point IV
ALLOWING MS. PENROSE'S COMPLAINT TO RELATE BACK
WOULD UNDERMINE THE DUTY TO ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE
THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF A CASE BEFORE
BRINGING SUIT.
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that a party and counsel
are under a positive obligation to undertake adequate investigation to assure
themselves of both the factual and legal basis for making their claims before filing
a complaint. Here, this means that Ms. Penrose and her attorney were required to
take such steps as were reasonably necessary to ascertain who was driving the auto
that collided with her back in 1996. Fortunately, such information5 is a matter of
public record, and, as argued by Mr. Ross in his memorandum in support of
summary judgment, is easily obtained by requesting an accident report from the

5

This information by law would also have been exchanged at the accident
scene pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-31. (Addendum D)
-15-

investigating agency. (Addendum C) Yet, in her opening brief, Ms. Penrose admits
that she did not take that simple step.
Allowing the complaint to relate back in this case would reverse all of the
general requirements that attend the filing of a lawsuit. Ms. Penrose's failure to take
the steps necessary to preserve her cause of action - even though she had four
years to ascertain the proper parties - would be excused. While, on the other hand
that failure would be used to justify the deprivation of the assurances that statutes
of limitation bring. The Court should not sanction such a result, especially in cases
such as this where the failure to name the proper party was the sole result of Ms.
Penrose's own negligence.
Point V
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION HAD AN ADEQUATE BASIS. IT
SHOULD BE UPHELD ON APPEAL.
Ms. Penrose also makes a brief stab at claiming that the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to make adequate findings of fact regarding the relation back
doctrine. She does not, however, flesh out that argument in any meaningful way, so
it is difficult to know how to respond to it.

It should be noted however, that the

fundamental facts that governed the resolution of this case were undisputed. Ms.
Penrose did not name Bryant Ross in a timely manner. Ms. Penrose amended her
complaint to name Bryant Ross after the statute of limitation had expired. Bryant
Ross and Christopher Ross have a familial relationship, were eventually represented
by the same counsel but are two distinct individuals with separate legal identities.

-16-

Based on these facts, the court made a ruling that as a matter of law, the amended
complaint did not relate back, and that it must be dismissed as untimely. This
adequately explains the ruling, and does not represent an abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Penrose's amended complaint was filed after the statute of limitations had
expired. An identity of interest cannot be established merely by showing that one
party is related to another or that they shared common legal representation.
Because there was no identity of interest as a matter of law, the amended complaint
was not timely, and the trial court properly dismissed Ms. Penrose's action. That
dismissal should be upheld by this court.
DATED this

2%K

day of _ 3 k k j

, 2002.

SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C.

RICHARD K. QLAUSER
MICHAEL W.WRIGHT
Attorneys for Appellee
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ADDENDUM B

RECORDED CLAIMS STATEMENT
Date and Time Sent: 1/12/01 4:17 PM

Claim Number: 44 1015 121

Return to: Julio Sandoval

Unit Printer*: 55/D

If questions, please call Beth Abernathy at (970) 395-5219

Q:
A:

This is this is Felix(sp?) ah Jensen(sp?) interviewing your first name is Nana(sp?)?
Right

Q:
A:

Is that the right pronunciation?
It's Nana.

Q:
A:

Nana and the last name Penrose?
Right.

Q:
A:

And that's P-E-N-R-O-S-E?
Right.

Q:
A:

Today's the 2nd of April 1997 the time is about ah 11:00 A.M. And ah your present
address please?
It's 1632 Princeton Avenue,

Q:
A:

And that's in Salt Lake City?
Right.

Q:
A:

And your zip code?
84105.

Q:

And this recorded statement is being given with your full knowledge and consent is that
correct?
Right.

A:
Q:

A:
Q:

Call your attention to on or about the 21st of November of 1996 at the 900 east and
about 850 south in Salt Lake City, Utah at about 12:38 P.M. I have it yoy,, had an
accident th&r&^with a Mr. Bryant Ross, is thatrcorrect?
Yes.

A:

Just tell me in your own words what happened as best as you recall. Where you were
going what took place anything you can tell me.
I was just driving urn south on that street and I was ah there's ah two tenss pach_way™-

Q:
A:

'Kay you were going south on 9th East?
Urn hum.

Q:
A:

Okay.
And I was in the lane next to the center.

Q:
A:

Alright.
And ah he came out of the parking lot of Smith's and he cut across the...
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Q:
A:

Well what's the what's what side of the street would that be?
The ah west side of the street.

Q:
A:

Okay and you were going south the inside lane?
Urn hum. And he cut across the area where the cars are parked and then another lane
and he just rammed right into the center of my car to where the front front fender or
somewhere I didn't see the car.

Q:
A:

Okay.
Knocked it into the next lane of oncoming traffic.

Q:
A:

So he hit you in the ah the passenger side of your vehicle?
Right.

Q:
A:

Did you have anyone else in the car with you?
No.

Q:
A:

Okay now tell me about the injuries that you suffered in the accident as best as you
know.
Um well um I- I hurt my neck...

Q:
A:

Okay.
My ah back...

Q:
A:

You have a cervical...
And ah...

Q:
A:

Spine sprain?
Ah cervical is the middle or neck?

Q:
A:

That's the neck.
Neck yeah and I think in my middle back too.

Q:
A:

Okay.
And ah and I've had headaches from whatever since um they seem to increase about
about maybe I don't know exactly how long ago maybe about a month or s- a month well
six weeks ago.

Q:
A:

Okay.
I wake up in the morning almost every morning with a dull headache especially when if I
slept on my side but sometimes and then if I slept on my back sometimes they diminish
a little bit and ah...

Q:
A:

Right.
Been going to physical therapy for that and um especially on the left side because oh as
much as I can figure is he hit the car in the right and it must've thrown me forward and to
the right where it pulled those muscles that so um I broke my hand I've had the back
problem and the neck...
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Q:
A:

Which which hand did you...
Had broke my left hand.

Q:
A:

Okay so the wrist or the hand itself?
The hand two two bones one's a spiral fracture and the other was a regular fracture.

Q:
A:

In the hand itself?
Yes.

Q:
A:

Okay.
And ah...

Q:
A:

Now who who is taking care of that...
Dr. Larcom.

Q:
A:

Larcom?
Larcom L-A-R-C-O-M, Peter.

Q:
A:

Larcom okay,
And um and so I had a cast on that or yeah I guess they call it a cast...

Q:
A:

Right right
And ah it's been stiff you know every since it's been pains on and off in it but but the
thing especially there's a couple of fingers that um tingle at the end and are numb at the
very end so I'm gonna see him again and see what there is to do about that with that um
trying to think what else.

Q:
A:

You have not recovered yet a- as far as you're aware?
No no.

Q:
A:

Okay.
I'm gonna um...

Q:
A:

Did you also,..
See another doctor about the neck because headaches it was recommended to see a
neurologist so...

Q:
A:

Yeah that might be a good idea. Now ah have you lost any time from work because of
this accident?
No.

Q:
A:

Okay.
Because I'm not working.

Q:
A:

You're not working okay. Ah let see the time of the accident was approximately I have it
at 12:38 P.M. is that correct?
I would guess about that time.

Q:

Okay. During the daylight hours then?
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A:

Yes.

Q:
A:

Any difficulty with the weather conditions anything like that?
N-...

Q:
A;

Snow on the road anything?
No.

Q:
A:

What did the fellow tell you when why he turned into you like that?
I didn't talk to him.

Q:
A:

He didn't he didn't talk to you at all?
No we were both his head he had a head injury.

Q:
A:

Okay.
I glanced over and saw blood on his head and they took me in an ambulance to the
hospital.

Q:
A:

Okay. Anything else you can tell me about the accident Ms. Penrose comes to your
mind? You were not speeding in anyway going down 9th East?
No I wasn't.

Q:
A:

Okay.
I was just traveling the regular speed.

Q:
A:

Alright.
I wasn't urn trying to think if there's anything else ah...

Q:
A:

So improper look out on the other guys part is probably what caused the accident?
Yeah I think that he was probably this is just my guess I don't...

Q:
A:

Yeah.
Know that he...

Q:
A:

Yeah that's...
The way he the way he was going it wa-1 just was wondering if he was accelerating
across a couple lanes of traffic to try to get into a left turn lane but that's purely
speculation...

Q:
A:

Yeah.
On my part i didn't...

Q:
A:

Okay.
Know.

Q:

Okay are the remarks that you have made in this statement ah your true version to the
accident to the best of your knowledge?
Is it a true version?

A:
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Q:
A:

Yeah right.
Yeah it is. i just don't know you know I haven't thought about it so I don't know if there's
any details that I've left...

Q:
A:

Well...
Right now or not.

Q:
A:

I think we've covered it pretty well. Okay...
Any other questions you wanna give me?

Q:
A:

No I think that's about all I need to ask you and ah this recorded statement has been
given with your knowledge and consent is that correct?
Correct.

Q:

Thank you Ms. Penrose this completes the recorded interview.
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ADDENDUM C

RICHARD K. GLAUSER (4324)
MICHAEL W. WRIGHT (6153 )
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C.
Parkview Plaza
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
(801)466-4228
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
NANA PENROSE,
)
;}

Plaintiff,
v.

AFFIDAVIT OF
J. KENT HOLLAND

;

CHRISTOPHER ROSS, an individual and ]
Does 1-5, inclusive, whose true names are])
not known to Plaintiff.
)
I
Defendants.
]

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

Civil No.: 000909391
Judge L.A. Dever

)
: ss.
)

I, J. Kent Holland, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as follows:
1.

I am an attorney duly licenced to practice law in the State of Utah, and have
been so for over twenty (20) years;

2.

During the past twenty (20) years, I have practiced extensively in the areas
of personal injury litigation and insurance defense and I am familiar with the
general practices and procedures utilized by legal counsel to obtain
information relating necessary to prosecute and defend such actions;

3.

It is a standard practice in this area of law to obtain the official accident
reports compiled by the investigating officer, which are available from either
the State of Utah or from the municipality or locality in which the accident
occurred;

4.

In order to obtain the official accident report a party, or a party's attorney,
need only request one from either the State or from the locality in which the
accident occurred, and need provide only his or her name and the date of
the accident;

5.

It is not necessary to provide the names of all parties who were involved in
the accident to obtain an official copy of the report.

FURTHER, AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
DATED this J f t

day of May, 2001.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 5 ^ •sti.
* ~ day of May, 2001.

:JMO?ARY PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake County, UT

Notary Public
|
ZENQKSA&TIAG0 *
^ ^ ^ ..„
L ^ T ^ l

767 East Dsonbee Avanu©
SaKLake City, Utah 84106
My Commission Explrce
January 30,2005
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, postage
pre-paid, this. 'y^O day of May#f, 2001, to:
Scott N. Cunningham
211 East 300 South, Suite 216
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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ADDENDUM D

41-6-31

MOTOR VEHICLES

41-6-31. Accident involving injury, death, or property
damage — Duties of operator, occupant, owner.
(1) The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or
death of any person or damage to any vehicle or other property, if the vehicle
or other property is operated, occupied, or attended by any person or if the
owner of the vehicle or property is present, shall:
(a) give to the persons involved his name, address, and the registration
number of the vehicle he is operating;
(b) upon request and if available, exhibit his operator's license to:
(i) any investigating peace officer present;
(ii) the person struck;
(iii) the operator, occupant of, or person attending the vehicle or
other property damaged in the accident; and
(iv) the owner of property damaged in the accident, if present; and
(c) render to any person injured in the collision reasonable assistance,
including the transporting, or the making of arrangements for the transporting, of the person to a physician, surgeon, or hospital for medical or
surgical treatment if it is apparent that treatment is necessary or if the
transporting is requested by the injured person.
(2) The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or
death of any person or property damage to an apparent extent of $1,000 or
more shall immediately and by the quickest means of communication available
give notice of the accident to the nearest office of a law enforcement agency.
(3) If the operator of a vehicle is physically incapable of giving an immediate
notice of an accident as required in Subsections (1) and (2) and there is another
occupant in the vehicle at the time of the accident capable of giving an
immediate notice, the occupant shall give or cause to be given the notice
required of the operator under this section.
(4) If the operator is physically incapable of making a written report of an
accident when required under Section 41-6-35 and he is not the owner of the
vehicle, then the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident shall within 15
days after becoming aware of the accident make the report required of the
operator under this section.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 21; C. 1943,
57-7-98; L. 1983, ch. 183, § 32; 1987, ch. 138,
§ 25; 1992, ch. 28, § 1; 1996, ch. 174, § 1.

Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, substituted
"$1,000" for "$750" in Subsection (2).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles
and Highway Traffic § 349 et seq.
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of statute
making it a criminal offense for the operator of
a motor vehicle not to carry or display his
operator's license or the vehicle registration

certificate, 6 A.L.R.3d 506.
Sufficiency of showing of driver's involvement in motor vehicle accident to support prosecution for failure to stop, furnish identification, or render aid, 82 A.L.R.4th 232.

41-6-32. Collision with unattended vehicle or other property — Duties of operator.
The operator of a vehicle which collides with or is involved in an accident
with any vehicle or other property which is unattended and which results in
398

